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I.     INTRODUCTION 
In late 2016, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in TC Heartland, 
LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC,1 a case addressing the 
interpretation of the special patent venue and the general venue statutes. 
The case was brought by Heartland, a sweetener manufacturer organized 
as a limited liability company under Indiana law and headquartered in 
Indiana.2 In 2014, Kraft sued Heartland for infringement of three patents 
on liquid water enhancers. Although Kraft is headquartered in Illinois, the 
lawsuit was brought in the District of Delaware, where Heartland is not 
registered to do business and does not have a regular or established place 
                                                                                                             
 *  Jaharis Faculty Fellow in Health Law and Intellectual Property, DePaul University 
College of Law. For helpful comments, I would like to thank Mark Moller and Josh 
Sarnoff. All errors remain my own. 
1 TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Brands Grp., 821 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. 
granted, 137 S.Ct. 614 (U.S. Dec. 14, 2016) (No. 16-341). 
2 Brief for Petitioner at 16-17, TC Heartland, LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 
No. 16-341 (Jan. 30, 2017) [hereinafter Petitioner Brief]. 
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of business.3 However, in 2013, some of Heartland’s accused products 
(representing approximately 2% of Heartland’s annual sales) were drop-
shipped to locations in Delaware at the request of an Arkansas-based 
customer.4 The court deemed this link sufficient to trigger personal 
jurisdiction in the patent lawsuit brought by Kraft. 
A thinly construed nexus—chiefly through the sale of goods—is not 
uncommon in establishing personal jurisdiction for corporations in 
general,5 and in patent infringement cases in particular. For the past quarter 
of a century, the Federal Circuit has interpreted the patent venue statute6 
permissively, enabling patentees to bring a lawsuit against a corporation 
in any district where personal jurisdiction arises.7 In the case of national 
companies like Heartland, this permissive approach allows patent 
infringement lawsuits to be brought anywhere in the United States where 
a modicum of sales may occur.8 
From a venue perspective, what sets patent infringement cases apart 
are the idiosyncrasies of forum shopping and forum selling created by 
permissive constructions of the patent venue statute. Among these 
idiosyncrasies, most notably, is the overwhelming volume of patent 
infringement cases being filed in the anomalous rural Eastern District of 
Texas.9 TC Heartland, now before the Supreme Court, provides an 
opportunity to alter this scenario.10 
In 2015, Heartland petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ of 
mandamus directing the Delaware trial court to dismiss the Kraft lawsuit 
for lack of personal jurisdiction, or transfer the case to the Southern 
District of Indiana due to improper venue.11 After the Federal Circuit 
denied the mandamus petition, Heartland filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari in September 2016, which the Supreme Court granted in 
December.12 If the Supreme Court rules in favor of Heartland, patent 
venue will be interpreted independently from the general venue statute, 
                                                                                                             
3 Petitioner Brief, at 16-17. 
4 Petitioner Brief, at 18. 
5 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (articulating the 
requirement of minimum contacts for a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
corporation); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985). 
6 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012). 
7 See infra, note 35-41 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra, section I.B Effects of Permissive Patent Venue. 
9 See infra, note 42-47 and accompanying text. 
10 TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Brands Grp., 821 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. 
granted, 137 S.Ct. 614 (U.S. Dec. 14, 2016) (No. 16-341). 
11 Petition for Writ of Mandamus, In re TC Heartland, LLC, No. 16-105 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 
23, 2015), ECF No. 2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2012) (authorizing transfer of a case 
when venue is improper). 
12 TC Heartland, 821 F.3d at 1338. 
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which will result in a narrower construction of venue in patent 
infringement cases.13 This, in turn, will likely lead to less patentee forum-
shopping as well as a redistribution of patent litigation across the 
country.14 
This Article explores the implications of the upcoming Supreme Court 
decision in TC Heartland v. Kraft. In Part II, this Article addresses the 
legislative history and interpretation of the patent venue statute by the 
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, as well as the effects that the 
Federal Circuit’s permissive constructions of venue have had on patent 
litigation over the past 27 years. Part III looks at possible outcomes after 
the Supreme Court’s decision in TC Heartland v. Kraft: it starts by 
discussing patterns of patent litigation redistribution in the event of a 
decision for Heartland, and then turns to alternative channels for achieving 
patent venue reform, should the Court side with Kraft. Finally, this Article 
concludes by positioning the outcome of the case into the larger ongoing 
debate surrounding patent exceptionalism. 
II.      EVOLUTION OF PATENT VENUE 
A. Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation of Patent Venue 
Federal courts have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over patent 
infringement cases.15 For a plaintiff to successfully initiate a lawsuit, the 
court must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant,16 and venue must 
be proper. In patent cases, the latter is governed by a special venue 
statute,17 first enacted in 1897.18 From 1789 to 1897, patent venue was 
governed by the general venue statute.19 Under the general statute and 
successive amendments,20 plaintiffs started bringing patent infringement 
lawsuits in almost anywhere in the Union.21 Congress intervened in 1897, 
                                                                                                             
13 See infra, note 78-82 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra, note 78-89 and accompanying text. 
15 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012). 
16 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
17 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012). 
18 Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695. 
19 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73 (1897) (limiting lawsuits to places where 
the defendant “is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found”). 
20 See Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552. 
21 Plaintiffs in patent infringement cases took advantage of the fact that diversity 
lawsuits could now be brought in the place of residence of either the plaintiff or defendant. 
See Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552, at 552-53; see also Richard C. Wydick, 
Venue in Actions for Patent Infringement, 25 STAN. L. REV. 551, 553 (1973) (describing 
how the broad general venue statute led to situations of abuse beyond the sphere of patent 
lawsuits). 
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enacting a separate patent venue statute that limited venue22 to two 
situations: 1) the place where the defendant inhabited; or 2) the place 
where the defendant committed infringing acts and had a place of 
business.23 
Until the mid-twentieth century, the special statute applicable to patent 
venue remained fairly isolated from the legislative and interpretive 
changes affecting the general venue statute. In the 1942 Stonite Products 
case, the Supreme Court confirmed that the 1897 patent statute alone 
governed venue in patent infringement cases.24 Six years later, however, 
as the Judicial Code was revised, Congress made textual changes that 
would affect venue.25 Instead of limiting patent venue to the place where 
the defendant “inhabits”—per the 1897 text—the 1948 revisions 
introduced the word “resides.”26 In its entirety, the newly codified section 
28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) states “[a]ny civil action for patent infringement may 
be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the 
defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and 
established place of business.”27 The text remains unchanged to this day. 
The general venue statute also underwent changes 1948 when it was 
revised and codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1391.28 In setting forth the residence 
criteria for purposes of general venue, Congress established in § 1391(c) 
that a corporate defendant could be sued in its place of incorporation or 
place of business, and that either locus would constitute corporate 
residence for venue purposes.29 The general standard was thus broader 
than the patent venue standard, a phenomenon that once again prompted 
questions about the relationship between special and general venue. 
The Supreme Court addressed these questions in 1957 in the Fourco 
Glass case, reaffirming the idea that there was no interplay between the 
two statutes.30 Section 1400(b) remained a special statute governing 
                                                                                                             
22 See Wydick, supra note 21, at 554-56. 
23 Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695 
24 Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 565, n.5, 566 (1942) 
(“Congress did not intend the Act of 1897 to dovetail with the general provisions relating 
to the venue of civil suits, but rather that it alone should control venue in patent 
infringement proceedings.”) 
25 See generally Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial 
Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 234-40 (1948). 
26 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012) (“Words in subsection (b) ‘where the defendant resides’ 
were substituted for ‘of which the defendant is an inhabitant.’”). 
27 Id. 
28 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1948). 
29 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2012) (“A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in 
which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial 
district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes.”). 
30 Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957). 
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patents and, therefore, its scope had not been broadened by changes to 
general venue.31 Under Fourco Glass, substituting “inhabits” with 
“resides” had no meaningful effect. 
In 1988, Congress amended general venue again.32 For corporate 
defendants, § 1391(c) now equated venue with personal jurisdiction:33 
For purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that 
is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial 
district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the 
time the action is commenced.34 
For parties in patent infringement lawsuits, the most relevant change 
introduced by the 1988 amendment to the general venue statute was, 
however, the inclusion of the words “under this chapter.” Because 
§ 1400(b) falls under the same chapter as § 1391(c), in 1990, the Federal 
Circuit held in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co. that the 
amended § 1391(c) governed patent venue as well.35 This meant that 
corporate residence attached to any place where there was personal 
jurisdiction, instead of only to the place of incorporation.36 VE Holding 
thus ushered in an era of permissible patent venue and opened the door for 
extensive forum shopping in patent infringement cases, as described in the 
following section.37 
                                                                                                             
31 Id. at 228 (“We think it is clear that § 1391(c) is a general corporation venue statute, 
whereas § 1400(b) is a special venue statute applicable, specifically, to all defendants in a 
particular type of actions, i.e., patent infringement actions.”). 
32 See generally Thomas W. Adams, The 1988 Revision of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(C): 
Corporate Venue Is Now Equivalent to In Personam Jurisdiction Effects on Civil Actions 
for Patent Infringement, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 357 (1991). 
33 Id. at 363-65. 
34 Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1013(a)-(b), 102 Stat. 4642 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. § 1391(c)). 
35 VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 
1990). 
36 Id. (“[V]enue in a patent infringement case includes any district where there would be 
personal jurisdiction over the corporate defendant at the time the action is commenced. 
While this test is narrower than allowing venue wherever a corporate defendant could be 
served, it is somewhat broader than that encompassed by the previous standard of ‘place 
of incorporation.’’) 
37 See infra, note 47-55 and accompanying text. See also Kimberly A. Moore, Forum 
Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 
889, 897 (2001) (discussing how VE Holding “rendered superfluous the patent venue 
statute for corporate defendants” and enabled widespread forum-shopping among 
patentees). 
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General venue was last amended in 2011. Among other changes,38 
Congress replaced “under this chapter” with “for all venue purposes.”39 
This change did not substantially affect the VE Holding-enabled 
permissive approach to patent venue. 
B. Effects of Permissive Patent Venue 
Permissive venue allows plaintiffs in patent infringement cases to 
engage in a particularly lenient form of forum shopping, as patentees have 
been able to sue in practically any federal court of their choosing for nearly 
three decades.40 Forum shopping in patent litigation predated the 1988-
1990 changes that broadened patent venue.41 In fact, forum shopping was 
one of the concerns that led to the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982.42 
Having jurisdiction that extends beyond patent appeals,43 the Federal 
Circuit contributed to what is often called “patent exceptionalism”44 at 
both substantive and (especially) procedural levels. But creation of a 
specialized appellate circuit for patent cases did not minimize the forum 
shopping problem,45 which assumed new contours after the Supreme 
Court ruling in VE Holding. 
                                                                                                             
38 See Pub. L. No. 112-63, § 202, 125 Stat. 758 (2011) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1391(a)) (establishing that general venue now governs “all civil actions brought in district 
courts of the United States”); id. at § 202 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2)) 
(establishing that the merging of venue and personal jurisdiction is no longer limited to 
corporations). 
39 Id. at § 202 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)). 
40 See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1451 (2010). 
41 See supra, note 32-35 and accompanying text; see also VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson 
Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
42 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Comm’n on Revision of the Fed. 
Court Appellate Sys., Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change 
(1975), reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195; see also J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for 
Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 631, 633, n.6 (2015); see generally Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 
(1989). 
43 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012); see LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE COURTS (2011); 
Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal 
Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 12 (2009) (describing how multiple-goal institutions 
tend to underperform in “goals that are hard to measure”); see also R. Polk Wagner & Lee 
Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial 
Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (2004) (discussing overall performance of the 
Federal Circuit in patent and non-patent cases). 
44 See infra, note 100 and accompanying text. 
45 See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice 
Affect Innovation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 892 (2001) (providing data that shows that this 
occurs before and after the creation of the Federal Circuit). 
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Empirical research has shown that the distribution of patent cases 
among the ninety-four judicial districts is so uneven that it cannot possibly 
be attributable to the relative size of civil dockets.46 In 2015, 44% of all 
5,830 patent cases filed in the United States were brought in the Eastern 
District of Texas, with the District of Delaware a distant second (9%), 
followed by the Central and North Districts of California (with 5% and 
4%, respectively).47 
The popularity of Texas—and of the predominantly rural Eastern 
District in particular—cannot be explained by geographical clustering of 
patent-intensive industries, as major technology hubs are located 
elsewhere as well.48 What, in fact, explains the anomalous rates of patent 
cases filed in the Eastern District of Texas is the patentee-friendly 
reputation of the district, attracting litigation through favorable procedural 
and administrative practices in patent cases.49 As corporate venue was 
interpreted to expand nationally, Texas became the preferred target for 
patent forum shopping.50 With forum shopping in patent cases on the rise 
since the early 1990s,51 the Eastern District of Texas went from a total of 
14 patent cases in 1999 to nearly 200 patent cases a year by the mid-
2000s;52 in 2012 that number skyrocketed to 1,247, while in 2015 it more 
than doubled to a grand total of 2,540.53 Between 2007 and the first half 
of 2016, the Eastern District of Texas attracted 20% of national patent 
litigation, followed by Delaware (12%) and the Central District of 
California (8%).54 
Among the practices that propelled the Eastern District of Texas to 
forum shopping prominence, scholars identified several factors that set the 
                                                                                                             
46 Id. 
47 See Colleen V. Chien & Michael Risch, Recalibrating Patent Venue, 77 MD. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 13) (Santa Clara Univ., Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 10-1). Early data for 2017 show the rate for the Eastern District of Texas at 35%. See 
Brief of 22 Law, Economics and Business Professors as Amici Curiae in support of 
Respondent (Mar. 8, 2017), at 3 (quoting from Docket Navigator Analytics, New Patent 
Cases, https://www.docketnavigator.com/stats). 
48 See J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 631, 
632-33 (2015) (noting that neither Texas nor Delaware are “home to a major technology 
industry”). 
49 Id. at 634. 
50 See generally Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical 
Study of the Meteoric Rise of the Eastern District of Texas As a Preeminent Forum for 
Patent Litigation, 9 YALE J. L. & TECH. 193 (2007). 
51 Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice 
Affect Innovation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 901 (2001). 
52 See Chien & Risch, supra note 47, at 12.  
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
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district apart.55 One of the most relevant is the Eastern District of Texas’s 
hostility to summary judgment,56 which traditionally favors defendants in 
patent lawsuits.57 As patent cases go to trial more often in Eastern Texas 
than elsewhere in the country, patentees also encounter more sympathetic 
juries; plaintiffs win 72% of jury trials in this district, as opposed to the 
national average of 61%.58 The district has also historically resisted the 
transfer of patent cases.59 Between 1991 and 2010, transfer motions had a 
34.5% success rate in the Eastern District of Texas, well below the 50% 
average in districts with long-established patent litigation.60 
In addition to a generally more favorable litigation atmosphere, in the 
Eastern District of Texas there is the possibility for plaintiffs to learn in 
advance the identity of the judge assigned to their case—a feature that has 
been described as “judge-shopping.”61 This happened in the wake of the 
implementation of the Patent Pilot Program in 2011.62 The Program was 
designed to increase patent expertise among federal judges63 by allowing 
reassignment of patent cases to “designated judges”—judges who 
volunteered to receive patent cases from non-program judges in the same 
district, or to receive randomly assigned patent cases.64 For participating 
districts, the probability of a specific judge being assigned to a patent case 
is less than one-third.65 The Eastern District of Texas, however, 
implemented the program in the way that greatly increases these odds: 
In contrast to the random assignment norm, the Eastern 
District of Texas assigns cases based on the division in 
which they were filed and, more importantly, specifies ex 
                                                                                                             
55 In addition to hostility to summary judgment and transfer, “judge-shopping” and 
quick scheduling, described in this section, Klerman & Reilly have identified additional 
areas setting the Eastern District of Texas apart as pro-plaintiff: loose interpretation of 
joinder rules; pro-plaintiff management of multi-Defendant cases; refusal to stay pending 
reexaminations; adoption of procedural rules that speed up discovery. Daniel Klerman & 
Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 99 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 257-70 (2016). 
56 See id. at 251-52 (noting that going to trial usually bolsters the plaintiff’s chances of 
winning a case). 
57 See id. at 251 (quoting John Allison et al., Understanding the Realities of Modern 
Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1787-90 (2014)). 
58 See id. at 254 (quoting Allison et al., supra note 57, at 1793-94). 
59 Id. at 260-63. 
60 See Andrei Iancu & Jay Chung, Real Reasons the Eastern District of Texas Draws 
Patent Cases—Beyond Lore and Anecdote, 14 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 315 (2011). 
61 Klerman & Reilly, supra note 55, at 251. 
62 Patent Cases Pilot Program, Pub. L. No. 111-349, 124 Stat. 3674 (2011) (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 137). 
63 See generally MARGARET S. WILLIAMS ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PATENT PILOT 
PROGRAM: FIVE-YEAR REPORT (Apr. 2016). 
64 Id. at 2. 
65 Klerman & Reilly, supra note 55, at 254-57. 
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ante via a public order the allocation of cases filed in each 
division. For example, in 2006 at the outset of the Eastern 
District’s popularity, patentees filing in the Marshall 
division were told they had a 70% chance of being 
assigned to Judge Ward, those filing in Tyler a 60% 
chance of Judge Davis, those filing in Sherman a 65% 
chance of Judge Schell, and those filing in Texarkana a 
90% chance of Judge Folsom.66 
In addition to the aforementioned factors, the Eastern District of Texas 
also boasts a reputation for swiftness, having one of the fastest patent 
dockets in the country.67 Median time to trial was 1.8 years during the early 
to mid-2000s, an average that increased to 2.3 years between 2008 and 
2015 as the patent caseload ballooned.68 
The convergence of these pro-plaintiff factors has thereby made the 
Eastern District of Texas the preferred forum for patentees. To be sure, 
forum shopping is not specific to patent litigation and the case of the 
Eastern District presents extreme characteristics. But it is a case where the 
outcomes disproportionately impact patent law, both procedurally and 
substantively. Jeanne Fromer, building on then professor and now Federal 
Circuit judge Kimberly Moore’s empirical work, summarized the 
detrimental effects of forum shopping associated with patent litigation:69 
1) patentees are more likely to win a case for procedural reasons (e.g. 
transfer of a motion) than through application of substantive patent law, a 
phenomenon that impacts both the “normative force” of patent law and 
patent policy as a whole;70 2) the legal system is manipulated by plaintiffs, 
bringing into question fundamental notions of justice;71 and 3) significant 
resources are consumed by litigation on forum choice instead of (or before 
getting to) substantive issues, impacting economic efficiency.72 
Patent forum shopping, while unavoidable to some extent, is 
ultimately undesirable at the scale reached in the Eastern District of Texas. 
As permissive patent venue greatly enabled forum shopping among 
patentees, the impending Supreme Court decision in TC Heartland v. Kraft 
has the potential to change the landscape in patent infringement litigation. 
This is not to say that, if the Court sides with Heartland, patent forum 
                                                                                                             
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 21-22. 
68 Id. 
69 See Fromer, supra note 40, 1464-65; but see Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore 
Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507 (1995) 
(weighing the potential benefits and costs of forum-shopping). 
70 Fromer, supra note 40, at 1464-65. 
71 Id. at 1465; see also Anderson, supra note 48, at 637. 
72 Fromer, supra note 40, at 1464-65. 
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shopping would end.73 But litigation would drift away from fora like 
Eastern Texas and, in this sense, would align patent venue patterns with 
those observed under general venue rules. 
III.     OUTCOME OF TC HEARTLAND V. KRAFT                                             
AND FORESEEABLE CONSEQUENCES 
A. Potential Impact of TC Heartland v. Kraft 
The question presented in TC Heartland v. Kraft is “[w]hether 28 
U.S.C. § 1400(b) is the sole and exclusive provision governing venue in 
patent infringement actions and is not to be supplemented by 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1391(c).”74 Contrary to the position embraced by the Federal Circuit in 
VE Holding,75 Heartland argues that the two provisions should not be read 
together.76 Should this view prevail, the Supreme Court would essentially 
exhume its own 1957 Fourco Glass decision and overturn the Federal 
Circuit; § 1400(b) would once again govern patent venue alone, without 
§ 1391(c) broadening the definition of residence.77 Consequently, a 
Supreme Court reversal of the Federal Circuit means that § 1391(c) 
(general venue) would no longer expand § 1400(b) (patent venue) to 
include any district where a corporation might have minimum contacts. 
Instead, patent venue for corporations would only be proper in one of two 
scenarios: 1) place of residence (i.e. incorporation) of the defendant; or (2) 
place where the defendant committed infringing acts and maintains a 
regular place of business.78 
Under the scenario in which plaintiffs have a more limited choice of 
fora in which to sue for patent infringement, there would be significant 
redistribution of patent cases across districts. Even before TC Heartland 
v. Kraft made its way to the Supreme Court, there was a consensus that a 
more restrictive approach to patent venue would lead to geographical 
clustering of patent litigation based on types of technology.79 Already in 
2010, Jeanne Fromer predicted that, if patent venue were restricted to the 
principal place of business of a corporation, “pharmaceutical suits w[ould] 
likely cluster in the District of New Jersey, and software patent suits 
                                                                                                             
73 See infra, note 90-92 and accompanying text. 
74 Petitioner Brief, supra note 2, at i. 
75 See supra note 35-41 and accompanying text. 
76 Petitioner Brief, supra note 2, at 20. 
77 Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 223-224 (1957). 
78 Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695. 
79 See Fromer, supra note 40, at 1447. 
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w[ould] likely group themselves in the Northern District of California, the 
District of Massachusetts, and the Western District of Washington.”80 
This approach would still translate into a limited number of courts 
deciding a high number of technology-specific patent cases.81 It would, 
however, exclude clustering in districts with no sizeable patent-driven 
industries and eliminate incentives for courts to compete for patent cases 
in these geographical areas. 
Recent empirical research maps out further implications of a potential 
win by Heartland.82 Looking at data from 2015 as a comparison point, if 
the Supreme Court’s decision were to lead to a restriction of patent venue, 
52% of corporations would be forced to choose a different district in which 
to sue for patent infringement.83 Overall, smaller defendants would benefit 
the most from a restrictive approach to venue, as the combination of 
regular place of business and districts where infringing acts occur—the 
only venue-triggering mechanism in addition to place of incorporation—
would likely span across more limited geographical areas.84 In fact, 
predictions show that nearly half of defendants (46%) would be sued in 
their principal place of business.85 
Empirical models also show that the type of technology around which 
companies cluster would play a role in the aftermath of a reversal of the 
Federal Circuit in TC Heartland v. Kraft. “TC Heartland would provide 
venue relief to over 50% of the defendants in all major sectors except 
finance and biopharma. The defendant industries that would experience 
the greatest relief, as measured by the proportion of migrating cases, under 
TC Heartland would be services, finance and tech.”86 
Predictably, the face of this patent litigation redistribution would be 
the Eastern District of Texas. Patent caseload in the District would drop 
from the 2015 high of 44% to 14.7%.87 Still, with reference to 2015 
numbers, the District of Delaware would climb from 9% to 23.8%.88 The 
Northern District of California would also see a significant increase, from 
4% to 13%, while the Central District of California (5% to 6.1%) and the 
                                                                                                             
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 1147-148 (stating that proponents of generalist courts (as opposed to specialized 
patent courts) argue that industry concentration would eventually lead to a natural 
specialization of judges and juries in these areas); see generally DAN L. BURK & MARK A. 
LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009). 
82 See Chien & Risch, supra note 47. 
83 Id. at 34. 
84 Chien & Risch, supra note 47, at 41 (noting that smaller defendants would benefit the 
most from venue relief because they have “relatively smaller footprints”). 
85 Id. at 35. 
86 Id. at 43. 
87 Id. at 37. 
88 Id. 
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District of New Jersey (5% to 5.3%) would experience less perceptible 
changes in patent litigation volume.89 
The following section situates these potential shifts in the context of 
the broader discussion of patent cases as outliers in the judicial system. It 
should be noted, however, that giving special treatment to patent venue—
as opposed to broadening it through general venue—has the effect of 
bringing patent litigation into consonance with patterns observed in non-
patent litigation in general, where courts in the District of Delaware play 
a preponderant role.90 Although paradoxical, this is not necessarily an 
undesirable effect; for example, as seen above, restrictive patent venue 
would be protective of smaller defendants. Nevertheless, the possibility of 
a reconfiguration of patent litigation across the United States raises several 
policy questions that might have motivated the Supreme Court to grant 
certiorari to TC Heartland v. Kraft. 
B. Patent Venue Exceptionalism in the Aftermath of                         
TC Heartland v. Kraft 
Patent venue reform does not depend exclusively on the Supreme 
Court ruling in favor of Heartland in the upcoming decision of TC 
Heartland v. Kraft. In fact, there have been multiple proposals to address 
this issue through legislative approaches.91The most recent attempt at 
reforming patent venue dates to March 2016, when the Venue Equity and 
Non-Uniformity Elimination Act (“VENUE Act”) was introduced in 
Congress.92 The proposed bill would require that: 
Any civil action for patent infringement or any action for 
a declaratory judgment that a patent is invalid or not 
infringed ( . . . ) be brought only in a judicial district 
(1) where the defendant has its principal place of 
business or is incorporated; 
(2) where the defendant has committed an act of 
infringement of a patent in suit and has a regular and 
                                                                                                             
89 Id. 
90 See Klerman & Reilly, supra note 55 (describing Delaware as a “magnet jurisdiction” 
for bankruptcy cases.). 
91 See generally Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Justice Scalia’s “Renegade District”: Lessons for 
Patent Law Reform, 83 TUL. L. REV. 111, 141, 145-151 (2008) (providing an account of 
attempts to reform patent venue through legislative action up to 2008). 
92 Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act of 2016, S.2733, 114th Cong. 
(2016) [hereinafter VENUE Act]. 
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established physical facility that gives rise to the act 
of infringement; 
(3) where the defendant has agreed or consented to be 
sued in the instant action; 
(4) where an inventor named on the patent in suit 
conducted research or development that led to the 
application for the patent in suit; 
(5) where a party has a regular and established 
physical facility that such party controls and operates, 
not primarily for the purpose of creating venue, and 
has— 
(A) engaged in management of significant 
research and development of an invention 
claimed in a patent in suit prior to the effective 
filing date of the patent; 
(B) manufactured a tangible product that is 
alleged to embody an invention claimed in a 
patent in suit; or 
(C) implemented a manufacturing process for a 
tangible good in which the process is alleged to 
embody an invention claimed in a patent in suit; 
or 
(6) in the case of a foreign defendant that does not 
meet the requirements of paragraph (1) or (2), in 
accordance with section 1391(c)(3).93 
For the past year, the VENUE Act has lingered in the Senate Judiciary 
Committee,94 from which it may not emerge,95 especially if the holding in 
                                                                                                             
93 VENUE Act, Sec. 2(b). 
94 Actions Overview: S.2733—114th Congress (2015-2016), LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/2733/actions (last visited Mar. 
3, 2017). 
95 It has been reported that the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee has chosen 
not to support the VENUE Act in favor of pursuing legislative options offering larger scale 
changes to patent law and policy. See Michael Rosen, Another Patent Reform Bill Just Died 
in Congress, TECHPOLICYDAILY.COM (May 19, 2016, 6:00 A.M.), http://www.techpolicy
daily.com/technology/another-patent-reform-bill-just-died-congress/ (last visited Mar. 3, 
2017) (quoting Kate Tummarello & Alex Byers, Zuckerberg: Facebook Wants to Meet 
With Conservatives, POLITICO (May 13, 2016, 10:09 AM), http://www.politico.com/tipshe
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TC Heartland v. Kraft results in a narrowing of patent venue that would 
significantly overlap with the scope of the bill. 
In any event, even if the Supreme Court chooses not to overturn the 
Federal Circuit on this issue, there appears to be sufficient momentum 
behind patent venue reform to trigger a landscape change in the near 
future. The fact that the Eastern District of Texas is now the poster child 
for venue abuse beyond the legal and scholarly milieu, capturing popular 
and political discourse has greatly advanced this cause.96 Whether venue 
reform will come in the form of a Supreme Court decision that is favorable 
to Heartland, through ad hoc legislative action, or bundled with broader 
reforms of patent law, however, still remains to be seen. 
Regardless of how it occurs, an upcoming reform is poised to break 
the 27-year link between patent and general venue.97 As explained above, 
shrinking patent venue would produce several desirable effects, curbing 
forum shopping by patentees to a certain extent and shielding smaller 
defendants from litigation in remote districts.98 Paradoxically, however, 
allowing patent venue to once again be solely governed by a special venue 
provision will reinscribe patent litigation into generic corporate litigation 
trends—patentees will flock primarily to the reemerging District of 
Delaware, and secondarily to jurisdictions with technology-intensive 
industries.99 
Patent law has a storied and controversial reputation for being 
exceptional,100 a byproduct of its underlying technical complexity. Yet a 
reform of patent venue along the lines discussed above, and irrespective 
                                                                                                             
ets/morning-tech/2016/05/zuckerberg-facebook-wants-to-meet-with-conservatives-grassl
ey-open-to-house-ecpa-reform-bill-comment-backlog-at-the-fcc-214288)(last visited Mar. 
3, 2017). 
96 See e.g., Julie Creswell, So Small a Town, So Many Patent Suits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
24, 2006); Daniel Nazer & Vera Ranieri, Why Do Patent Trolls Go to Texas? It’s Not for 
the BBQ, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Jul. 9, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplink
s/2014/07/why-do-patent-trolls-go-texas-its-not-bbq; Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: 
Patents (HBO television broadcast Apr. 19, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3b
xcc3SM_KA. 
97 VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 
1990). 
98 See supra, note 78-89 and accompanying text. 
99 See supra, note 83-89 and accompanying text. 
100 See Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 
1415 (2016) (noting that “[a]lthough tensions between universality and exceptionalism 
apply throughout law, they are particularly relevant to patent law”); see also James Donald 
Smith, Patent Exceptionalism with Presidential Advice and Consent, 65 DUKE L.J. 1551 
(2016) (stating that the Federal Circuit—in itself an example of an exceptional entity in the 
configuration of the United States judicial system—is often singled out as the ultimate 
embodiment of patent exceptionalism, not only because of its stand-alone institutional 
design, but also (and primarily so) because of its procedural decisions on patent appeals). 
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of its agent, would result in de facto unexceptional behavior through 
restrictive application of a special patent procedural provision. Aberrant 
forum shopping, as embodied by the current patent litigation cluster in the 
Eastern District of Texas, would greatly diminish. Patent forum shopping 
would fall to levels that match forum shopping in other areas of the law, 
with the unsurprising resurgence of the District of Delaware—a district 
that has historically been a stalwart of different types of corporate 
litigation. In sum, treating patent venue specially would potentially 
contribute to normalize patentee forum shopping, eradicating some of the 
most outrageous side effects of the permissive approach to venue that has 
marked the past 27 years.101 
Patent law as a whole—or even the subset of procedural patent law—
will not become more or less exceptional because of the Supreme Court 
decision in TC Heartland v. Kraft. But whether reform comes via the 
Supreme Court or a different channel, patent venue per se is likely to 
become less aberrant and, in this sense, will produce considerably fewer 
extreme and exceptional results. 
IV.     CONCLUSION 
For nearly three decades, patent venue was interpreted through a 
connected reading of the special patent venue statute and the general venue 
statute. This led to a permissive delineation of venue in patent 
infringement lawsuits, which in turn generated extreme forms of patentee 
forum shopping, as well as detrimental court competition for patent 
litigation. 
In TC Heartland v. Kraft, the Supreme Court has a chance, and is 
expected, to overturn the Federal Circuit’s approach to venue. If the Court 
sides with Heartland, plaintiffs will have a more limited choice of fora in 
patent infringement lawsuits and patent litigation will see a redistribution 
across districts. The Eastern District of Texas will lose much of its patent 
caseload, which will migrate to the District of Delaware as well as districts 
in areas with significant technology hubs. 
Even if the Supreme Court upholds the Federal Circuit’s position, 
there is still room for (and some momentum behind) patent reform through 
legislative action. When reform does occur, venue in patent lawsuits will 
begin to realign with trends in other fields. Reform will not eradicate 
                                                                                                             
101 The most well-known of these being perhaps the construction of an ice rink by 
Samsung in front of the Marshall, Texas courthouse, where Samsung has repeatedly been 
sued for patent infringement, in attempt to maintain a positive image of the company 
among potential jurors. See Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Patents (HBO television 
broadcast Apr. 19, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3bxcc3SM_KA at 8:08. 
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forum shopping, however, but it will prevent exceptional forms of forum 
shopping like the ones that led to the rise of the Eastern District of Texas 
as the premier patent district in the country. 
 
